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Tibbetts: William James and the Doctrine of 'Pure Experience'

William James and the
Doctrine of 'Pure Experience'*
Paul Tibbetts
In this paper I will attempt to trace the evolution of the concept 'experience'
in the writings of William James. This will take us from his early psychological
and scientific inquiries, where a strong element of sensationism is evident; through
his middle or phenomenalistic period, where he came under the influence of Mach
and Wundt; and finally culminating in the doctrines of pure experience and radical empiricism, his most distinctive contributions to the epistemology of experience. As the concept of experience underwent a number of subtle changes in
James's mind, largely under the influence of Mach and Wundt, I will have occasion
to briefly develop their views. In addition to these largely oneway influences, I
will suggest some later important parallels to James's more mature views regarding experience, parallels which would perhaps at first sight not be apparent to
most readers.
Part I.

The Concept of 'Experience' in James's Psychological Writings.

Throughout the Principles of Psychology we find James employing the Lockean
distinction between sensation and reflection on sensation, between what is immediately present to the senses and what is the product of logical inference in
judgment. This distinction is clearly evident in the following analogy .
. . . Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off in sensations
would be like bridges without piers. Systems about fact must plunge
themselves into sensation as bridges plunge their piers into the rock.
Sensations are the stable rock, the terminus a quo and the teminus ad
quem of thought. To find such termini is our aim with all our theoriesto conceive first when and where a certain sensation may be had, and
then to have it. Finding it stops discussion. Failure to find it kills the
false conceit of knowledge . Only when you deduce a possible sensation
for me from your theory, and give it to me when and where the theory
requires, do I begin to be sure that your thought has anything to do with
truth. I
In the concluding chapter of the Principles, "Necessary Truths and the Effects
of Experience", James continued and further elaborated upon this distinction
between 'what comes before us' and 'what we think'.2 Later in the same
chapter he remarked that the empirical psychologist, and the scientist in general,
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must clearly differentiate in his writing between the 'empirical order of things'
and 'their rational order of comparison'.3 This distinction obviously parallels
that made by David Hume between matters of fact and relations of ideas, with
the latter either being derived by induction from the former or else simply true
by definition and therefore tautological in character.
Even though James had been working on the Principles for twelve years, that
is, from 1878-1890, these above distinctions were present from the very beginning of this long period. For example, in "Reflex Action and Theism" , published in 1881, James had already recognized a distinction between the 'conceiving
or theorizing faculty', the 'world of our conceptions', on the one hand, and the
'world of our impressions ' on the other.4 It was in this early article that James
marveled at "the miracle of miracles : ... that the given order lends itself to our
remodeling. It shows itself plastic to many of our scientific, . . . aesthetic, and
practical purposes and ends."5
Even though he wondered at this strange and unique ability that man-asknower, man-as -theorizer, possesses, he continued to affirm throughout the
Principles the empiricist view that all valid scientific abstractions are ultimately
traceable back to and grounded in everyday experience and, in turn, the world
of the senses. The analogy of the bridge was more than a useful metaphor; it
was a declaration of James's faith in traditional empiricism.
It is interesting to note here that Wilhelm Wundt, the greatest German
psychologist of the nineteenth century (to whom James in the Principles refers
to and quotes more than any other writer), was also struggling to develop a
more adequate account of the dimensions of experience than had heretofore
been given. Though Wundt agreed with James in distinguishing between outer
and inner experience, Wundt employed somewhat different criteria for making
this distinction. Rather than adopt th e vocabulary of sensation and reflection,
Wundt used that of 'immediate' and 'mediate' experience. Where empiricism
and James held that outer and inner experience refer to different types of
objects (sensations and ideas , respectively), Wundt maintained that 'outer' and
'inner' designate different points of view: mediate experien ce and immediate
experience. Wundt then drew the implication regarding the epistemological
priority of psychology over the physical sciences for dealing with immediate
experience .
. . . This division indicates two directions for the treatment of experience.
One is that of the natural sciences, which concern themselves with
objects of experience, thought of as independ ent of the subject. The
other is that of psychology, which investigates the whole content of
experience in its relations to the subject and also in regard to the
attributes which this content derives directly from the subject. The point
of view of natural science may, accordingly, be designated as that of
mediate experi en ce, since it is possible only after abstracting from the
subjective factor present in all actual experience; the point of view of
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psychology, on the other hand, may be designated as that of immediate
experience, since it purposely does away with this abstraction and all
its consequences. 6
By not starting at the outset with any particular a priori commitment toward
the empiricist conception of experience, Wundt was able to formulate a far
more sophisticated position of it than was James at this time. I say sophisticated
because in his Essays in Radical Empiricism James was later to adopt some of
Wundt's own insights into experience. I think it must be admitted that the
sensation-reflection distinction did presuppose a metaphysical distinction between
an external and an internal reality, the one acting on our senses and giving rise
to impressions, the other a private realm of ideas and their associations. Furthermore, where sensations are a-historical and universal in character, being prior
to the effects of experience and subjective attitude, reflections quite literally
'reflect' the experience and sagacity of the person who postulates and entertains them.
There is only fairly damaging criticism of the sensation-reflection distinction
which caused, or should have caused, those who honored this distinction to have
second thoughts in this matter. Wundt early anticipated the criticism John
Dewey expressed in Experience and Nature .
. . . It is pure fiction that " sensation," or peripheral excitation, or stimulus,
travels undisturbed in a solitary state in its own coach-and-four to
enter the brain or consciousness in its purity.7
When philosophers have insisted upon the certainty of the immediately
and focally present or "given" and have sought indubitable immediate
existential data upon which to build, they have always unwittingly pass ed
from the existential to the dialectical; th ey have substituted a general
character for an immediate this . For the immediately given is always the
dubious; it is always a matter for subsequent events to determine, or
assign character to. 8

As we will see, James later came to the same conclusions as Dewey did .
However, Dewey's argument was pres ent in at least embryonic form in one
of James's earliest publications, a critique of Spencer's theory of mind . " . . . the
knower is not simply a mirror .. ., passively reflecting an order that he comes
upon and finds simply existing . ... " 9 That is to say, the mind is not a mere onlooker but an actor with a central role to perform in the drama of experience .
Unfortunately, James did not at this point go much beyond making these generally negative remarks as to what role mind does not play in experience.
Until after the publication of the Principle s, it was largely left to others to
develop the implications of these insights. Bertrand Russell once remarked of
G. E. Moore that in their common reaction to British Idealism, and their subsequent adoption of Naive Realism, 'Moore led the way and I followed '. The same
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could be said of the relation between Wundt and James: the one led and the other
followed. Anticipating James's notion of pure experience, for example, Wundt
once remarked of his own epistemology that it starts with one essential principle,
that
... there is only one experience, which, however, as soon as it becomes
the subject of scientific analysis, is , in some of its components, open to
two different kinds of scientific treatment, to a mediate form of treatment ,
which investigates ideated objects in their objective relations to one
another, and to an immediate form, which investigates the same objects
in their directly known character, and in their relations to all the other
contents of the experience of the knowing subject. 10
In the same context, there is one other important German thinker at this
time who also greatly influenced James's views regarding experience, Ernst
Mach, thus helping to 'lead the way' . In his now classic Analysis of Sensations,
the first edition of which appeared in 1885, five years before James's Principles
were published and eleven years before Wundt's Outlines of Psychology, Mach
systematically explored the notion of a 'pure sensation', Wundt's 'one experience' above. Mach started with the principle of a pure sensation, i.e., a
sensation which is neither physical nor psychical in character, but which is the
original datum for all knowledge concerning physical and psychological events.
These pure sensations or 'elements' become the subject matter of physical science,
physiology, or psychology depending upon the functional relations and contexts
they are placed in by the perceiver.
The supposedly impassable gulf between physical and physiological inquiry,
on the one hand, and psychological investigation on the other is not an ontological
but methodological separation. That is to say, if-following Mach-the same
pure sensation can be taken up into any or even all three possible combinations,
then what distinguishes physics from psychology is not a different subject matter
but the system of relations (or, using more contemporary terminology, the
'conceptual framework') that is employed.
A color is a physical object as soon as we consider its dependence , for
instance, upon its luminous source, upon other colors, upon temperatures,
upon spaces, and so forth. When we consider, however, its dependence
upon the retina (the elements KLM ... J, it is a psychological object, a
sensation. Not the subject-matter, but the direction of our investigation,
is different in the two domains. 11
Returning to the central theme of this paper, it is not so much a difference
in the immediate experience between that of the physicist, the neurophysiologist,
and the introspective psychologist that sets these three areas of inquiry apart
from each other as it is the theoretical framework and explanatory principles
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each employs in his respective domain. Pure experience for Mach, and for James
as we will see, does not come 'tagged' as physical, bodily, or mental. These
are methodological designations made from a specific point of view and for
specific purposes.
In summary of Part I, we have briefly seen how James, as he successively
came under the influence of traditional British Empiricism, Wundt and then
Mach, moved from the sensation-reflection model of experience, to that of the
distinction between Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge About, and
finally settled on a doctrine of pure experience and radical empiricism. Let us
now turn our attention to that important period between the Principles and the
group of papers which later made up the Essays in Radical Empiricism. This
period is essential for understanding James's most mature philosophical views
on experience.
Part II. The Period of Transition.

During the Winter term of the 1897-1898 school year, James conducted a seminar
entitled "Philosophical Problems of Psychology", the lecture notes for which
Ralph Barton Perry has included in his two volume study, The Thought and
Character of William James. 12 Throughout these Notes James was preoccupied with
the 'pure experience hypothesis', according to which the same datum of an
experience could be 'taken over again in a different context' and subsumed under
different categories, as Perry expressed it. This is obviously the identical
hypothesis Mach and Wundt struggled with ; in fact, as Perry notes, one of the
required texts in James 's seminar was Mach's Analysis of Sensations!
Shortly after giving this seminar, James contributed to an article on experience
in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1901), edited by James Baldwin.
James there defined experience as
... the entire process of phenomena, of present data considered in their
raw immediacy, before reflective thought has analyzed them into subjective and objective aspects or ingredients. It is the summum genus of
which everything must have been a part before we can speak of it at all. 13
James above all wanted to stress the essential 'neutrality of signification' of this
term. With this in mind he added the following remarks.
If philosophy insists on keeping this term indeterminate, she can refer
to her subject-matter without committing herself as to certain questions
in dispute. But if experience be used with either an objective or a subjective shade of meaning, then question-begging occurs, and discussion
grows impossible. 14
Here we finally have James 's arrival at the doctrine of pure experience.
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Part III: The Last Period: The Doctrine of Pure Experience
We now come to James's most mature and comprehensive statement regarding
the notion of experience, which appeared under the title Essays in Radical
Empiricism. So as not to alienate the reader with what at first might appear to
be too radical a view, James begins the first essay in this collection by depicting
the contemporary state of philosophical thought.
It is difficult not to notice a curious unrest in the philosophic atmosphere
of the time, a loosening of old landmarks , a softening of oppositions, a
mutual borrowing from one another on the part of systems anciently
closed, and an interest in new suggestions, however vague, as if the one
thing sure were the inadequacy of the extant school-solutions. The dissatisfaction with these seems due for the most part to a feeling that
they are too abstract and academic.
I propose, therefore, to describe the pattern as clearly as I can consistently with great brevity, and to throw my description into the bubbling
vat of publicity where, jostled by rivals and torn by critics, it will
eventually either disappear from notice, or else, if better luck befall it ,
quietly subside to the profundities, and serve as a possible ferment of
new growths or a nucleus of new crystallization. IS

Where James made his first distinctive contribution to the notion of experience
was in his emphasis that experience is not given as so many individual bits and
pieces, i.e. , as the atomic-like impressions conjured up in human psychology.
According to James a true empiricism should certainly not include any element
that is not directly experienced,-but neither should it exclude what is originally
given in experience. In opposition to traditional empiricism, James held that
conjunctive relations as just as much a part of original experience as what is
related.
Now, ordinary empiricism, in spite of the fact that conjunctive and disjunctive relations present themselves as being fully co-ordinate parts
of experience, has always shown a tendency to do away with the connections of things , and to insist most on the disjunctions. Berkley's
nominalism, Hume 's statement that whatever things we distinguish are
as 'loose and separate' as if they had 'no manner of connection,' . . .
[this] and the general pulverization of all Experience by association and
the mind-dust theory , are examples of what I mean.
Radical empiricism, as I understand it, does full justice to conjun ctive
relations , without, however, treating them as rationalism always tends
to treat them, as being true in some supernal way, as if the unity of
things and their variety belong to different orders of truth and vitality
altogether. 16
In the preface to the Meaning of Truth he later added that " .. . the relations
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between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive are just as much matters of
direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things
themselves."!7
In fact, the omission of conjunctive relations from the empiricist world-view
directly led to the attempt by the rationalists to correct this deficiency. Rationalism
accomplished this by introducing " . . . trans-experiential agents of unification,
substances, intellectual categories and powers, or Selves; whereas, if empiricism
had only been radical and taken everything that comes without disfavor, conjunction as well as separation, each at its face value, the results would have
called for no such artificial correction."18
John Dewey expressed the identical criticism against traditional empiricism a
number of years after James wrote these lines. In Reconstruction in Philosophy
Dewey remarked that once we come to see that the isolated and simple impressions of Locke and Hume are not part of original experience but " ... answer to
certain demands of their theory of mind, the necessity ceases for the elaborate
Kantian and Post-Kantian machinery of a priori concepts and categories to
synthesize the alleged stuff of experience."!9 The glue which binds the elements
of experience together is part of the experience itself. Rather than have recourse
to the kantian 'categories of the understanding' and the 'transcendental schematism'
to organize and unify immediate phenomenal experience, our experiences come
conjoined. As might be suspected, this point was a constant source of irritation
and dispute between pragmatism, on the one hand, and intellectualism, British
idealism, and absolutism, on the other.
The second major theme in the Essays in Radical Empiricism is the conception
of pure experience, which we encountered earlier in James's Notes and in Baldwin's
Dictionary.
'Pure experience' is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life
which furnishes the material to our latter reflection with its conceptual
categories ... an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is
not yet any definite what, ... But the flux of it no sooner comes than it
tends a fill itself with emphases, and these salient parts become identified
and fixed and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through
with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions .20
The most philosophically important pair of adjectives which pure experience
becomes 'shot through with' are 'mental' and 'physical'. The essentially neutral
or pure character of original experience proved historically to be quite difficult
for readers of James to grasp. Commentators kept reading either an idealism or
a physicalism into James, depending upon their own particular learnings. Is not
the notion of a 'pure experience' much like an intellectual intuition? reasoned
one group of thinkers. Another group saw the concept of 'pure experience' as
an implicit denial of intellectualism (which it was) and therefore a vote for a
physicalistic interpretation of experience. James of course denied both inter-
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pretations, though this did little to lessen the misunderstandings that arose.
In his important essay, "Does 'Consciousness ' Exist?", James restated and defined as pointedly as possible this neutral character of original experience.
The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the 'pure '
experience. It is only virtually or potentially either subject or object as
yet. For the time being, it is . . . unqualified actuality, or existence, a
simple that. 21
Even the notion of 'consciousness' was something absent in pure experience;
it, like the terms 'psychical' and 'mental', was something that arose in reflection
on experience and therefore in retrospect. To say that in pure experience we
are 'conscious' would be to violate its essentially neutral character since the
term 'conscious' has mentalistic and subjective connations which James wished
to avoid . As Perry once remarked, James 's doctrine of radical empiricism really
required a new term such as 'phenomenon' or 'pure experience ', " ... which shall
not be confused with consciousness, but shall constitute a more intuitive manifold
within which consciousness itself shall be distinguished and explained."22 In
his incisive article on James, Arthur Bentley also voiced this same comment.
To restate James's datum by injecting, however craftily, some form of
subjective into its veins is to falsify your report on James . To assign
it physiologically a research home in a brain or neural system is to
abandon James's full field of behavioral inquiry for a narrow specialty.. . Speak of "experience" and you must mean "pure experience" if you
want to talk about James in his own sense; you cannot imply that "experience" exists by that name, with the "pure" form as one of its
varieties ; you are obligated in James 's texts to understand the . .. "experiencing" and "the experienced" equally and together- the "subjective
and objective both at once"- unsevered except as in later inquiry you
may trace and appraise any differentiation that may show itself.23
We have now completed our examination of the concept of experience and
its development in James's writings . We have followed this concept through the
oftentimes explicit sensationism of the ps ychological writings, where James
often resorted to the model of sensation and reflection , impressions and ideas,
- thus revealing the influence of Locke and Hume. In the phenomenalistic period
we picked up the thread of phenomenalism in the notion of pure or neutral
experience, testifying to the explicit influence of certain contemporary thinkers,
especially Mach and Wundt. In his last set of writings-which we can term his
ph enomenological period, for reasons that will soon become evident-we saw the
doctrine of pure experience linked up with one of his most important philosophical
insights, his radical empiricism. This last doctrine is at once a mataphysics (which
is developed in A Pluralistic Universe) , an axiology or theory of value (as seen in
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The Meaning of Truth, the Will to Believe, and in the Varieties of Religiolls
Experience), and an epistemological theory regarding the nature and source of
knowledge and the relation between the perceptual and the conceptual (which
James began to explicate in his last work Some Problems of Philosophy). In this
paper we have confined ourselves to developing the major elements of this
third dimension of radical empiricism and its relation to the notion of pure
experience.24 With this summary in mind, let us now turn to the fourth and last
part of this paper.
Part IV. Examples of the Concept of Pure Experience in Twentieth Century Thinkers
There are three major psychologists and philosophers who to different extents
drew upon James's notion of pure experience: E. C. Tolman, J. P. Sartre, and
M. Merleau-Ponty. That these four figures employed the same basic concept
as one of the pillars of their respective systems, should strongly suggest the
potential explanatory and unifying power of James 's philosophy, at least in
its epistemological dimension.
E. C. Tolman was one of the foremost behavioral scientists of his generation
so it was therefore quite a surprise when I came across an article of his,
"Psychology Versus Immediate Experience" (1935), where he defended the
notion of immediate experience. As most readers are aware, the behaviorist
is primarily concerned with excluding any references whatsoever to subjective,
mental states due to their private and non-observable character. Only by
limiting his descriptions to overtly observable and, consequently, measurable
behavior will the psychologist establish a truly scientific account of human action.
That behaviorism has traditionally had close affiliations with operationism,
positivism, and physicalism is of course no accident. Unlike his fellow behaviorist
Watson, who gravitated toward the most naive form of reductionism, Tolman
expressed a surprising methodological sophistication.
In the above article Tolman began with a behavioristic statement of creed.
In this paper I am going to try to indicate my notion concerning the

nature and subject-matter of psychology. I am a behaviorist. I hold that
psychology does not seek descriptions and intercommunications concerning immediate experience per se. Such descriptions and attempts at
direct intercommunication may be left to the arts and metaphysics.
Psychology seeks, rather, the objectively statable laws and processes
governing behavior. Organisms, human and subhuman, come up against
environmental stimulus situations and to these stimulus situations they,
after longer or shorter intervals of time, behave. The laws and processes
determining this their behavior are statable in objective terms. 25
One of the standard rejoinders of the mentalist is that 'though you may
choose to concentrate on overt behavior, nevertheless there are still mental states,
images, ideas, and so forth which only another method , that of introspection,
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can make explicit and describe.'26 Most of us immediately tend to sympathize with
the introspectivist's argument since we have all experienced subjective states
in one form or another. We tend to think of our mental states as an array of
immediately given private presentations . Physical states and events, on the
other hand, we naturally conceive of as independent and outside us, that is,
outside our body. Upon reflection we conclude that the physical can only be known
mediately throughout sensations. Didn't the good Bishop Berkeley feel that
this was the view dictated by common sense? This distinction between what is
immediately and what is mediately known was of course a main feature of
Wundt's position.
What Tolman in effect did was to simply abandon this conception of two
metaphysical levels, a physical world 'out there ' and numerous private mental
'Worlds. The former would be the province of the physical sciences, the latter of
psychology. He did this by adopting James 's conception of pure experience, which
as we have seen is itself neither mental nor physical. Introspective psychology
and the physical sciences (including behaviorism) are but so many sets of 'logical
constructs' or conceptual frameworks for interpreting and organizing immediate
or pure experience.
I shall hold that immediate experience just as it appears, contains quite
as much objectivity as it does subjectivity. Immediate experience, as
initially given, is not my private world nor your private world. It is not
something to be studied primarily by psychology. It is , rather, an initial,
common matrix out of which both physics and psychology are evolved.
It is the only tangible real that we have. Physics does not present another
real behind that of immediate experience. Nor does psychology, as such,
study this real of immediate experience in a more first-hand way than
does physics. Physics is a set of logical constructs-a set of rules and
equations whereby we are aided in finding our way about from one
moment of immediate experience to another. Further, and this purports
to be the only new and specific contribution of this pap er, psychology is,
I shall argue, but another set of logical constructs, another set of rules
and equations, which, when added to those of physics, will give us still
further aid in finding our way about from one moment of experience
to the next. 27
He then goes on to draw the important conclusion that
There is, if you will, still left in my universe a dichotomy, but it is a
dichotomy not between physical entities, and mental entities, but
between both of these as mere logical constructs, on the one hand, and
immediate experience on the actually given, rich , qualitied, diffuse, matrix
from which both sciences are evolved on the other.28 -[my italics]
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Let us now move from these behaviorally-orientated writers to two major
representatives of the phenomenological movement, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty. Rather than refer to Sarte's major philosophical work Being
and Nothingness (1943). the doctrine of pure experience is I feel more clearlyand certainly more vividly-expressed in his philosophical biography, Nausea.
For James, in pure experience the 'things' of everyday experience loose their
familiarity, their cultural and personal significance,-that is, their meaning.
Just as a one syllable word that is repeated two or three times a second soon
becomes literally meaningless, so can an artifact or natural object loose its usual
signification, becoming a brute 'thatness' set over against consciousness. Through
his character Roquentin, Sartre has managed to convey quite well the experience
where the familiar qualities of an object are nihilated. Roquentin is sitting alone in
a park near an oak tree when he is overwhelmed with pure experiences .
. . . existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look
of an abstract category: it was the very paste of things, this root was
kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the
sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted ,
leaving soft, monsterous masses, all in a disorder-naked, in a frightful.
obscene nakedness. 29
In commenting on this description, the Dutch phenomenologist Hans Linschoten
once remarked that things had not only lost their individuality but " ... Nothing
remains other than masses, monsterous and soft, that flow into one another.
They are divested of their meaning and loose in their nakedness, their vast,
trustworthy structure ... The word "absurdity" comes to me only at the time
that I want to describe the experience."3o
Words remain inadequate to express pure experience, not because of the
lack of certain terms and locutions but simply due to the fact that such experience is pre-linguistic, pre-reflective and pre-symbolic in character. The
distinction between pure experience and reflective thought parallels that drawn
by Bergson between 'intuition' and 'analysis', with intuition being that mode or
dimension of knowledge (if one would call it knowledge) which dispenses with
symbols and therefore with language. As Sartre expressed it through his character
Roquentin, " . . . the world of explanations and reasons is not the world of
existence" or pure experience. 3! Continuing in this account of his encounter in
the garden, Roquentin strives in vain to repeat the formula: "This is a root"but language failed to work its magic.
I saw clearly that you could not pass from its function as a root, as a
breathing pump, to that, to this hard and compact sea lion, to this oily,
callous, headstrong look. The function explained nothing: it allowed you
to understand generally that it was a root, but not that one at all.
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This root, with its colour, shape, its congealed movement, was . . .
below all explanation.32
I got up and went out. Once at the gate, I turned back. Then the
garden smiled at me. I leaned against the gate and watched for a long
time. The smile of the trees, of the laurel, meant something; that was
the real secret of existence . . . . Even if I could have stayed leaning
against the gate for a century, I had learned all I could know about
exis tence. 33
In defence of Roquentin's inability to express his profound experience in the
garden, Linschoten once remarked that it is unreasonable to expect the phenomenal
world of pure experience to be identical with our linguistic descriptions and
analyses of that world. "That which is the foundation of every analysis cannot
itself be reduced to that which is constructed and comes into being only in that
analysis. "34
Under the influence of James, Husserl and Bergson, Merleau-Ponty continued
the epistemological distinction between the immediate and the inferential dimensions of experience and knowledge. To the non-symbolic , non-mediated level of
experience, Merleau-Ponty assigned the term 'perception,' in contrast with reflective or conceptual activity. Corresponding to the different levels of experience are
different strata or orders of reality: the perceptual, the sensory, the imaginary,
the ideational, the religious, and so forth. This pluralities of orders of reality is
practically identical to James's discussion of the 'sub-universes' mentioned earlier.
James Edie, one of the most informed commentators on Merleau-Ponty's thought,
has remarked that throughout the latter's thought runs the belief that" ... in all
these other levels or realms of experience we will rediscover the fundamental
structures of perceptual consciousness, but transformed and enriched and therefore qualitatively irreducible to perception as such ... [Even] the seemingly independent structures of categorical thought (of "rationality") are ultimately founded
in perception. "35 For both Merleau-Ponty and James, though, all of these 'universes
of discourse' are ultimately grounded in immediate, pre-reflective experience, in
what Merleau-Ponty called the "primacy of perception." In a paper bearing this
title Merleau-Ponty stressed this point.
By these words, the 'primacy of perception,' we mean that the experience
of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truth, values
are constituted for us; that perception is a nascent logos; that it teaches
us, outside all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself; that it
summons us to tasks of knowledge and action. 36
In his classic Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty sought to
systematically present a phenomenological or descriptive account of perceptual
(pure) experience, while maintaining that perceptual experience was on no
account to be identified with sensation. As Merleau-Ponty once remarked, his
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major work was essentially an attempt 'to define a method for getting closer to
present and living reality.' This is one of the reasons why Merleau-Ponty added
in the same preface that the world is not what I think about but 'what
I live through.' And, reechoing the admonitions of Mach and James that psychology
and physics are but rationales or explanations of pure experience, he said in the
preface to the Phenomenology of Perception that all the efforts of phenomenology
" ... are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the
world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status." Phenomenology
begins- and can only begin-with the recognition that
All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge , is gained
from my own particular point of view, or from some experience of the
world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless. The
whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced,
and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at
a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the secondorder expression. 37
James expressed exactly the same sentiments half a century earlier.
Our 'scientific' ways of thinking the outer reality are highly abstract ways.
The essence of things for science is not to be what they seem, but to be
atoms and molecules moving to and from each other according to strange
laws. Nowhere does the account of inner relations produced by outer
ones . . . , more egregiously break down than in the case of scientific
conceptions. The order of scientific thought is quite incongruent either
with the way in which reality exists or with the way in which it comes
before US. 38 [my italics 1
It is this basic distinction between 'what comes before us' and 'what we think'

that is perhaps the most fundamental conclusion in the philosophy-or rather
phenomenology- of William James and Merleau-Ponty.39
These unavoidably brief references to Sarte and Merleau-Ponty should at
least suggest to the reader why so many phenomenologists are greatly interested
in James 's writings, especially those works dealing with 'experience.' But even
those psychologists who have not as yet made the mistake of identifying phenomenology with traditional introspectivism, nor radical empiricism with a return to
subjectivism, have much to profit from both James and Merleau-Ponty. Witness
the case of Tolman and Boring. Surely it must be admitted by any behavioral
scientist with epistemological leanings, that thes e latter two thinkers were far
more sophisticated methodologically than many contemporary theorists. The fas cination with statistics and qu antitative techniques in general; the idolization of
cybernetic models and information theory; the urgency for more and more precise
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studies of brain structure; the rising interest in the chemistry and metabolism of
the nervous system ;-all reveal the increasing physicalistic character of contemporary psychology.
Unfortunately, in the heat of all this inquiry we have lost sight of two essential
facts. (1) We have forgotten that science is a 'second-order level of expression;'
science occurs on a fundamentally different epistemic level of experience since
it is essentially a rationale or explanation of both everyday and pre-reflective
experience. This is not intended as a criticism of science but as a sincere desire
to place scientific activity in its proper perspective. To hold that scientific knowledge captures or expresses immediate experience per se, rather than being a
rationale of such experience, is to lapse back into that philosophical naivete that
characterized nineteenth century mechanism and twentieth century physicalism.
(2) By treating science as the major if not the only genuine means for attaining
empirical knowledge, we in fact deny, a priori, the possibility of other cultural
modes of inquiry as sources of genuine knowledge and explanation. Art, religious
experience, and everyday experience-Husserl's Lebenswelt- are seen in a quite
different light once they, along with science in general, are interpreted as so many
attempts to bring chaos into a cosmos, that is, to effect the transmutation of immediate experience into relatively stable working principles.-This last point is the
bridge leading from James 's radical empiricism to his pragmatism.
If we keep these two suggested admonitions in mind then it may prove entirely
possible in this century to bring about that long sought solidarity and unity between the physical sciences, on the one hand, and the humanistic disciplines on
the other. Between, as the Germans express it, the Naturwissenschaften and the
Geisteswissenschaften. The working of these human pursuits into one framework
will come though only with the recognition that all of these disciplines are explanatory and, to different extents, unavoidably postulational in character. My thesis
throughout this paper has been that James's conception of pure experience provides the thread to lead us through and out of the labyrinth of contemporary
thought.
But this multiplicity and disparateness does not denote discord or disharmony. All these functions complete and complement one another ...
The dissonant is in harmony with itself; the contraries are not mutually
exclusive, but interdependent: "harmony in contrariety, as in the case of
the bow and the lyre."4o
University of Dayton
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